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Patent
Trademark
Copyright
Design
Filing Date
Decision Verdict Date
Court / Tribunal
Bench / Panel Judges
Petitioner / Claimant (Plaintiff)
Star Pipes
Respondent / Defendant
Akhil Sivaraman, Sajan A.S., Star King Polymer Private Limited
Dispute Summary
The Kerala High Court granted an interim injunction in favor of Star Pipes, restraining the respondents from using the registered trademark 'STAR' or any similar mark. The court found that the respondents' mark was a colorable imitation of the appellant's mark, and there was a strong likelihood of confusion among consumers. The court allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order, granting the interim injunction till the disposal of the suit.
Outcome / Ruling
plaintiff_favorable
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Full text judgment
[Cites 14 , Cited by 0 ] Kerala High Court Star Pipes vs Akhil Sivaraman on 30 June, 2026 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANU TUESDAY, THE 30TH DAY OF JUNE 2026 / 9TH ASHADHA, 1948 FAO NO. 98 OF 2025 AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 10.06.2025 IN IA 2/2025 IN OS NO.2 OF 2025 OF ADDITIONAL DISTRICT COURT-IV, THRISSUR APPELLANT/PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: STAR PIPES A PARTNERSHIP FIRM, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER, FAINA ANTIO, AGED 43 YEARS, STAR PIPES, VII/360, MANITHARA ROAD, AVANOOR PANCHAYATH, P.O. CHOOLISSERY, THRISSUR, PIN - 680541. BY ADVS. SHRI.C.HARIKUMAR SHRI.VIZZY GEORGE KOKKAT SMT.SANDRA SUNNY SHRI.ARUN KUMAR M.A SMT.FARAH JYOTHI PRADEEP SMT.AISWARIYA V.R. RESPONDENTS/RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS: 1 AKHIL SIVARAMAN S/O. SIVARAMAN R., CHETTIKULANGARA P.O., ALAPUZHA, PIN - 690106. 2 SAJAN A.S. ARYANPARAMBU VATTAYAAL WARD, THIRUVAMBADY P.O., ALAPUZHA, PIN - 688002. 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 2 3 STAR KING POLYMER PRIVATE LIMITED BUILDING NO/FLAT NO VI/48, THACHADIYIL GSKV LOWER PRIMARY SCHOOL, PATHIYUR, KAREELAKULANGARA, PATHIYUOOR, ALAPUZHA, PIN - 690572. BY ADVS. SMT.SREELAKSHMI SABU SRI.MAHESWARAN V.P. SRI.SHARAN SHAHIER THIS FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDERS HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 16.06.2026, THE COURT ON 30.06.2026 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 3 S.MANU, J. -------------------------------------------------- FAO No.98 of 2025 ------------------------------------------------- Dated this the 30th day of June, 2026 JUDGMENT Plaintiff in O.S.No.2/2025 of the Additional District & Sessions Court-IV, Thrissur, has filed this appeal aggrieved by rejection of the application for interim injunction filed in the suit as I.A.No.2/2025. The suit was filed for prohibiting the respondents from using registered mark 'Star' or any other similar or deceptively similar mark of the plaintiff. The other prayer in the suit is to allow the plaintiff to recover an amount of Rs.50,000/- along with 12% interest from the personal property of the defendants. 2. Appellant is a partnership firm manufacturing and marketing PVC, UPVC pipes, sanitary installations, pipe fittings and adhesives, sanitary ware, bath ware, hoses, water tanks 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 4 and loft tanks. 'Star' is its registered trademark. According to the appellant, the 'Star' mark was the first to be certified with ISI quality certification in South India in the year 1988. It has expanded its business to various States and abroad in Dubai. Appellant claims that due to uncompromising attitude towards maintaining quality, the 'Star' mark has gathered tremendous goodwill and reputation for their products under the brand name. 3. The respondents 1 and 2 are former employees of the appellant. It came to the notice of the appellant that they formed a new private company named 'STAR KINGS POLYMERS PVT LTD.' The said company is also engaged in the same business. According to the appellant, the respondents are engaged in making false representations to the customers and distributors, implying a connection with the appellant. Appellant alleges that the deliberate attempt to pass off the respondents' products as those of 'Star Pipes' is unlawful and unethical. 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 5 Appellant further alleges that the dominant portion of the mark of the respondents is the word 'STAR'. Such a mark has been purposefully and dishonestly adopted by the respondents with the ulterior motive of creating an impression that they are still associated with the appellant, thereby deceiving and confusing the public. They are well aware that the trademark 'Star' has been registered under the Trade Marks Act . Since the actions of the respondents are causing irreparable injury and loss, the appellant filed the suit and sought temporary injunction by filing I.A.No.2/2025. However, the learned Additional District Judge rejected the said application and hence this appeal. 4. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents. Perused the impugned order and the relevant records. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant assailed the impugned order, contending that there was no proper consideration of the contentions of the appellant by the learned 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 6 Additional District Judge. He submitted that the learned Judge failed to note the apparent dishonest intention of the respondents. He submitted that the conclusion of the learned Judge that the word 'Star' is not unique is flawed as even the respondents had no such contention. The learned Judge failed to note that if a mark is a unique combination of generic/descriptive words and has acquired goodwill and reputation in the market it is eligible for registration and for protection under the Trade Marks Act . It was also argued that the learned Judge erred in violating the anti-dissection rule and examined the individual elements. Further the learned counsel submitted that the learned Judge also violated the principle that similarities between the rival marks are to be given emphasis rather than dissimilarities. It was also argued that the learned Judge ignored the phonetic similarity. It was also argued that the learned Judge omitted to consider the likelihood of passing off in a proper perspective. He further submitted that the 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 7 learned Judge went wrong in relying on the judgment in Bharathiya Coffee Workers Catering Service Pvt Ltd v. Indian Coffee Workers Co-operative Society Ltd [1999 KHC 96]. He contended that it is well evident that the respondents 1 and 2, two ex-employees of the appellant started a business of identical nature by allotting a deceptively similar trademark. Their attempt is obviously to capitalise the advantageous market condition created by the appellant. He submitted that the learned Additional District Judge has committed a grave error by rejecting the application for injunction. He therefore submitted that the appeal may be allowed by granting interim injunction as prayed for in the I.A. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent highlighted the dissimilarities between the trademarks of the appellant and that of his parties. He submitted that the trademark of respondents is dissimilar in every aspect and even the word 'STAR' is used in the said trademark in a totally different style. 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 8 He pointed out that the mark contains the depiction of a crown on the letter 'R' and the two words 'KINGS POLYMERS' following the word 'STAR'. He submitted that the word 'Star' is a generic and common word and nobody can claim exclusive trademark rights with respect to such a word. He contended that the respondents company is a small establishment having limited volume of business. He pointed out that the appellant has sought only an amount of Rs.50,000/- as compensation from the respondents and that itself would show that the appellant has not suffered any loss as alleged. He also submitted that the respondents have approached the trademark registry already for registration of their trademark. He vehemently denied the allegation that the respondents 1 and 2 formed the new company and adopted a deceptively similar trademark with dishonest intentions. The learned counsel asserted that the trademarks of the appellant and the respondents have no similarities apart from the facts that the word 'STAR' is used in 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 9 both. However, that fact by itself is not a reason to hold that the two trademarks are deceptively similar. The learned counsel contended that the application for interim injunction was rightly rejected by the learned Additional District Judge. He hence submitted that no interference is warranted in this appeal and it is liable to be dismissed. 7. It is not disputed that the respondents 1 and 2 were employees of the appellant. Therefore, they are obviously aware of the fact that the trademark of the appellant is registered. They formed a new company and got involved in the same business as that of the appellant. They chose to adopt a trademark which contains the word 'STAR' as the prominent feature. Question is as to whether they have infringed the rights of the appellant under the Trade Marks Act . 8. In Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai and Others [(2022) 5 SCC 1], a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court comprehensively analyzed the 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 10 provisions of Sections 28 and 29 of the Trade Marks Act and laid down the principles to be applied in cases of infringement of trade mark. Regarding the relevant provisions of Sections 28 and 29 as well as the Scheme of the Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "48. The legislative scheme is clear that when the mark of the defendant is identical with the registered trade mark of the plaintiff and the goods or services covered are similar to the ones covered by such registered trade mark, it may be necessary to prove that it is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public, or which is likely to have an association with the registered trade mark. Similarly, when the trade mark of the plaintiff is similar to the registered trade mark of the defendant and the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark are identical or similar to the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark, it may again be necessary to establish that it is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public. However, when the trade mark of the defendant is identical with the registered trade mark of the plaintiff and that the goods or services of the defendant are identical with the goods or services covered by registered trade mark, the Court shall presume that it is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public. 49. Having considered the legislative scheme as has been elaborately provided in the said Act, it will be apposite to refer to the observations of this Court, while considering Section 21 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 in Durga Dutt Sharma [Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 11 Pharmaceuticals Laboratories, (1965) 1 SCR 737: AIR 1965 SC 980] : (AIR pp. 989-90, para 28). "28. The other ground of objection that the findings are inconsistent really proceeds on an error in appreciating the basic differences between the causes of action and right to relief in suits for passing off and for infringement of a registered trade mark and in equating the essentials of a passing off action with those in respect of an action complaining of an infringement of a registered trade mark. We have already pointed out that the suit by the respondent complained both of an invasion of a statutory right under Section 21 in respect of a registered trade mark and also of a passing off by the use of the same mark. The finding in favour of the appellant to which the learned counsel drew our attention was based upon dissimilarity of the packing in which the goods of the two parties were vended, the difference in the physical appearance of the two packets by reason of the variation in the colour and other features and their general get-up together with the circumstance that the name and address of the manufactory of the appellant was prominently displayed on his packets and these features were all set out for negativing the respondent's claim that the appellant had passed off his goods as those of the respondent. These matters which are of the essence of the cause of action for relief on the ground of passing off play but a limited role in an action for infringement of a registered trade mark by the registered proprietor who has a statutory right to that mark and who has a statutory remedy for the event of the use by another of that mark or a colourable imitation thereof. While an action for passing off is a 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 12 common law remedy being in substance an action for deceit, that is, a passing off by a person of his own goods as those of another, that is not the gist of an action for infringement. The action for infringement is a statutory remedy conferred on the registered proprietor of a registered trade mark for the vindication of "the exclusive right to the use of the trade mark in relation to those goods" (vide Section 21 of the Act). The use by the defendant of the trade mark of the plaintiff is not essential in an action for passing off, but is the sine qua non in the case of an action for infringement. No doubt, where the evidence in respect of passing off consists merely of the colourable use of a registered trade mark, the essential features of both the actions might coincide in the sense that what would be a colourable imitation of a trade mark in a passing off action would also be such in an action for infringement of the same trade mark. But there the correspondence between the two ceases. In an action for infringement, the plaintiff must, no doubt, make out that the use of the defendant's mark is likely to deceive, but where the similarity between the plaintiff's and the defendant's mark is so close either visually, phonetically or otherwise and the court reaches the conclusion that there is an imitation, no further evidence is required to establish that the plaintiff's rights are violated. Expressed in another way, if the essential features of the trade mark of the plaintiff have been adopted by the defendant, the fact that the get-up, packing and other writing or marks on the goods or on the packets in which he offers his goods for sale show marked differences, or indicate clearly a trade origin different from that of the registered proprietor of the mark would be immaterial; whereas in the case of passing off, the defendant 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 13 may escape liability if he can show that the added matter is sufficient to distinguish his goods from those of the plaintiff." 50. It could thus be seen that this Court has pointed out the distinction between the causes of action and right to relief in suits for passing off and for infringement of registered trade mark. It has been held that the essentials of a passing off action with those in respect of an action complaining of an infringement of a registered trade mark, cannot be equated. It has been held that though an action for passing off is a common law remedy being an action for deceit, that is, a passing off by a person of his own goods as those of another; the action for infringement is a statutory right conferred on the registered proprietor of a registered trade mark for the vindication of the exclusive rights to the use of the trade mark in relation to those goods. The use by the defendant of the trade mark of the plaintiff is a sine qua non in the case of an action for infringement. It has further been held that if the essential features of the trade mark of the plaintiff have been adopted by the defendant, the fact that the get-up, packing and other writing or marks on the goods or on the packets in which he offers his goods for sale show marked differences, or indicate clearly a trade origin different from that of the registered proprietor of the mark, would be immaterial in a case of infringement of the trade mark, whereas in the case of a passing off, the defendant may escape liability if he can show that the added matter is sufficient to distinguish his goods from those of the plaintiff. 51. Again, while considering the provisions of Section 21 of the 1940 Act, this Court in Ruston & Hornsby [Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engg. Co. , (1969) 2 SCC 727], observed thus : (SCC pp. 729-30, paras 4-6) 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 14 "4. It very often happens that although the defendant is not using the trade mark of the plaintiff, the get up of the defendant's goods may be so much like the plaintiff's that a clear case of passing off would be proved. It is on the contrary conceivable that although the defendant may be using the plaintiff's mark the get up of the defendant's goods may be so different from the get up of the plaintiff's goods and the prices also may be so different that there would be no probability of deception of the public. Nevertheless, in an action on the trade mark, that is to say, in an infringement action, an injunction would issue as soon as it is proved that the defendant is improperly using the plaintiff's mark. 5. The action for infringement is a statutory right. It is dependent upon the validity of the registration and subject to other restrictions laid down in Sections 30 , 34 and 35 of the Act. On the other hand the gist of a passing off action is that A is not entitled to represent his goods as the goods of B but it is not necessary for B to prove that A did this knowingly or with any intent to deceive. It is enough that the get-up of B's goods has become distinctive of them and that there is a probability of confusion between them and the goods of A. No case of actual deception nor any actual damage need be proved. At common law the action was not maintainable unless there had been fraud on A's part. In equity, however, Lord Cottenham, L.C., in Millington v. Fox [Millington v. Fox, (1838) 3 My & Cr 338 : 40 ER 956] held that it was immaterial whether the defendant had been fraudulent or not in using the plaintiff's trade mark and granted an injunction accordingly. The common law courts, however, adhered to their view that fraud was 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 15 necessary until the Judicature Acts, by fusing law and equity, gave the equitable rule the victory over the common law rule. 6. The two actions, however, are closely similar in some respects. As was observed by the Master of the Rolls in Saville Perfumery Ltd. v. June Perfect Ltd. (1941) 58 RPC 147 at p. 161 (HL): 'The statute law relating to infringement of trade marks is based on the same fundamental idea as the law relating to passing-off. But it differs from that law in two particulars, namely (1) it is concerned only with one method of passing-off, namely, the use of a trade mark, and (2) the statutory protection is absolute in the sense that once a mark is shown to offend, the user of it cannot escape by showing that by something outside the actual mark itself he has distinguished his goods from those of the registered proprietor. Accordingly, in considering the question of infringement the courts have held, and it is now expressly provided by the Trade Marks Act, 1938 , Section 4 , that infringement takes place not merely by exact imitation but by the use of a mark so nearly resembling the registered mark as to be likely to deceive.' " 52. It could thus be seen that this Court again reiterated that the question to be asked in an infringement action is as to whether the defendant is using a mark which is same as, or which is a colourable imitation of the plaintiff's registered trade mark. It has further been held that though the get-up of the defendant's goods may be so different from the plaintiff's goods and the prices may also be so different that there would be no probability of 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 16 deception of the public, nevertheless even in such cases i.e. in an infringement action, an injunction would be issued as soon as it is proved that the defendant is improperly using the plaintiff's mark. It has been reiterated that no case of actual deception nor any actual damage needs to be proved in such cases. This Court has further held that though two actions are closely similar in some respects, in an action for infringement, where the defendant's trade mark is identical with the plaintiff's trade mark, the Court will not enquire whether the infringement is such as is likely to deceive or cause confusion." 9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court categorically held in paragraph 56 of the judgment that in case of an eventuality covered under clause (c) of sub section (2) of Section 29 , in view of the provisions of sub section (3) of Section 29 of the Act, the Court shall presume that it is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public. Section 29(2) reads as under: "(2) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which because of-- (a) its identity with the registered trade mark and the similarity of the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark; or (b) its similarity to the registered trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark; or 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 17 (c) its identity with the registered trade mark and the identity of the goods or services covered by such registered trade mark, is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public, or which is likely to have an association with the registered trade mark." 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held as under in Paragraph No.59:- "59. In these circumstances, we are of the considered view that it was not open for the High Court to have entered into the discussion as to whether the appellant-plaintiff's trade mark had a reputation in India and the use of the mark without due cause takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the registered trade mark. We find that the High Court has erred in entering into the discussion as to whether the respondent-defendants and the appellant-plaintiff cater to different classes of customers and as to whether there was likely to be confusion in the minds of consumers with regard to the hotel of the respondent-defendants belonging to the same group as of the appellant-plaintiff's. As held by this Court in Ruston & Hornsby, in an action for infringement, once it is found that the defendant's trade mark was identical with the plaintiff's registered trade mark, the Court could not have gone into an enquiry whether the infringement is such as is likely to deceive or cause confusion. In an infringement action, an injunction would be issued as soon as it is proved that the defendant is improperly using the trade mark of the plaintiff." [ Emphasis added] 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 18 11. It is thus clear that when it is proved that the defendant is improperly using the trade mark of the plaintiff, an order of injunction would be issued. 12. The respondents do not dispute that the trademark of the appellant is registered and it enjoys goodwill and reputation. The prominent feature of the trademark of the respondents is the word 'STAR'. Though the fonts used are different, capital letters are employed and a crown is drawn above the letter 'R', in my view, the mark of the respondents can be considered only as a colorable imitation of the mark of the appellant. There is strong likelihood of confusion being created among consumers, as the respondents are also engaged in the very same business. Prima facie, it appears that the trademark of the respondents was designed by employing the essential feature of the mark of the appellant 'Star' as the prominent feature with some deliberate modifications in order to claim that the marks are not deceptively similar. 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 19 13. In Pernod Ricard India Private Limited and Another v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, in an infringement analysis, the test is whether there is likelihood of confusion or association in the mind of the public. It is not a matter dependent on testimonial evidence. It is a matter of judicial determination. There is no requirement to prove actual deception or damage. Trademarks are remembered by their overall commercial impression and even minor variations may be perceived by consumers as brand extensions or sub-brands. When the marks of the appellant and the respondent are compared, keeping in mind the above principles and on account of the prominent feature being the same word and products also being the same, there is very high likelihood of the mark of the respondent being perceived as a sub-brand or brand extension of the appellant. 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 20 14. I find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Addl. District Judge has not appreciated the dispute from a proper perspective. 15. As I have found force in the contention of the appellant regarding infringement of trademark, it is unnecessary to delve deep into the other contentions including that of passing off at the interlocutory stage. I am of the view that the appellant has made out a strong prima facie case. Balance of convenience is in favour of the appellant since its mark was registered in the year 2020 and it is involved in business under the trade name since 1984. If the respondents, who are involved in the same business as that of the appellant are not restrained from using the mark "STAR" during the pendency of the suit, it may result in irreparable injury to the appellant. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal is allowed. Impugned order is set aside. I.A.No.2/2025 in O.S.No.2/2025 is allowed. The respondents are restrained, by an interim 2026:KER:47354 FAO No.98 of 2025 21 injunction, from manufacturing and selling products using the registered trademark 'STAR' or any other similar or deceptively similar mark to the appellant's registered trademark, till the disposal of the suit. Sd/- S.MANU JUDGE skj
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