Arctic Invent - Update Case

Case Lawsuit Title *

Case / Trial ID Number

Jurisdiction Code *

Category *

Filing Date

Decision Verdict Date

Court / Tribunal

Bench / Panel Judges

Petitioner / Claimant (Plaintiff)

Respondent / Defendant

Dispute Summary

Outcome / Ruling

Verdict Document PDF URL

Full text judgment

[Cites
29
, Cited by
0
]
Himachal Pradesh High Court
Sml Limited vs M/S Happy Agro Chemicals on 2 July, 2026
Author:
Sandeep Sharma
Bench:
Sandeep Sharma
2026:HHC:26056

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
                                       OMP No.34 of 2024 in COMS No.3 of 2024
                                                        Order reserved on: 11.05.2026

.
Date of Decision: 02.07.2026

_______________________________________________________
    SML Limited                          .......Applicant/plaintiff
                                                Versus

M/s Happy Agro Chemicals        ... Respondents/Defendants
    _______________________________________________________

of
    Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? 1
    For the Applicant:      rt       Mr. Ashok Aggarwal, Senior   Advocate
                                     with Dr. Sanjay Kumar, Ms. Arpita
                                     Sawhney, Mr. Atul      Jhingan,       Mr.
                                     Priyansh Sharma, Mr. Ankit   Thakur, Mr.

Sanket Singh Sengar and Ms. Akanksha
                                     Chauhan, Advocates.
For the Respondents: Ms. Ranjana, Advocate vice Mr. Rajesh
                         Kashyap,     Advocate     for    defendant/

respondent No.1.
Ms. Devyani Sharma, Senior Advocate with
                         Mr. Vipul Sharda, Mr. Ankit Virmani and Mr.

Raditya Katoch, Advocate, for defendants
                         /respondents No.2 and 3.
____________________________________________________
    Sandeep Sharma, Judge(oral):
Order at hand shall dispose of an application filed by the

applicant/plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with
Section

151
CPC, seeking therein direction to restrain the respondents/

defendants         by themselves, their directors, partners, licensees,

stockiest and distributors, agents and /or anyone claiming through any

of them jointly and severally from infringing the patent rights of the
1
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
2
2026:HHC:26056

applicant under Indian Patent No.282092 by advertising, launching,

making, using, offering for sale, selling, importing and/or exporting any

.
product including "SELZIC" or any other product covered by the suit

patent IN 282092 granted in March 30,2017 to the applicant/plaintiff.
2.           Afore prayer made on behalf of the applicant/plaintiff has

been seriously opposed by the respondents/defendants by filing

of
    detailed reply to the application. Before ascertaining the correctness

of the rival contentions raised at the behest of the parties to the lis,

this Court finds it necessary to take note of certain facts, which may
                        rt
    be relevant for adjudication of the application at hand, which reads as

under:-
a)    The     applicant/plaintiff     which     is    a    company

incorporated under the
Companies Act, 1956
,
                       claims itself to be a research-driven organization

involved in developing and promoting the use of
                       advanced high-performance, end to end solutions

in crop nutrition, crop protection, bio-stimulants and
                       bio-fertilizers. Plaintiff also claims itself to be owner

of various patents inter alia Indian Patent No.
                       282092, which was granted to the plaintiff on
                       30.3.2017 under
Section 43
of the Patents Act,
                       1970,     for    agricultural      composition          entitled
                       "Agricultural Composition" for twenty years. Plaintiff
                       also claims to have received rights qua suit patent
                       through assignment agreement from one Mr.
                       Deepak Pranjivandas Shah. It is also averred in
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
3
2026:HHC:26056

the plaint that as many as 13 countries have
          granted patents in respect of suit patent. As per the
          plaintiff, while its prayer for grant of patent in

.
question was being considered no pre or post grant

oppositions were filed by defendants. Two entities
          had filed pre-grant oppositions, however same

were dismissed vide order dated 30.03.2017
          (Annexure-G      at   pages     38-69       of     Plaintiff's

of
          documents). Thereafter two post-grant oppositions
          under
Section 25(2)
of Patents Act, 1970 were filed
          by two entities, which were also dismissed on
            rt
          16.6.2023(Annexure-I at pages 89-169 of Plaintiff's
          documents).
b)   It is averred in the plaint that in terms of
Section 48
of the Act which defines rights of patentee, it has
          exclusive right to prevent third parties, who do not

have his consent from the act of making using,
          offering for sale, selling or importing for those

purposes that product in India.
c)   Plaintiff has alleged that infringing acts on the part

of defendants by offering to sell the suit patent
          under the brand name, "SELZIC" and thus alleged

infringement of rights of the plaintiff qua the suit
          patent. With the aforesaid material averments, suit
          has been filed seeking permanent injunction against
          the defendants from infringing the patent rights of
          plaintiff qua suit patent. The plaintiff has also sought
          direction for the removal of infringing product from all
          websites and online platforms, a decree for recovery of
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
4
2026:HHC:26056

Rs.1.02 Crores and an order directing defendants to
                       destroy the stocks of infringing product.
3.           Alongwith suit, plaintiff also filed an application under

.
Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 read with
Section 151
of the Code of

Civil Procedure seeking therein interim injunction against the

defendants to the effect, as detailed hereinabove. It is averred in the

application that unauthorized launch, advertisement, manufacture,

of
    market use, sale, offer for sale and/or export of the infringing product

covered by the suit patent in the Indian market within the territorial
                       rt
    jurisdiction of this Court by the respondents is ongoing and therefore,

there is an urgency to restrain the respondents from infringing the

patent rights of plaintiff qua suit patent by making, advertising,

launching, using, offering for sale, selling, importing and/or exporting

of the infringing product, sold under brand name "SELZIC" or any

other product under any brand. Vide order dated 12.01.2024, this

Court granted ad-interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff, thereby

restraining the defendants from infringing the Patent right of the

plaintiff. The order was passed ex-parte restraining the defendants

from directly or indirectly dealing in its products, including "SELZIC"
which allegedly infringes the suit patent.
4.           Against afore order dated 12.01.2024, the defendants

preferred Commercial Appeal bearing OSA No.05 of 2024, titled

ULink Agri Tech Private Limited vs. SML Limited and others,
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
5
2026:HHC:26056

which came to be allowed vide order dated 20.08.2024. In afore order,

Division Bench of this Court returned finding that an ex-parte ad-
.
interim injunction must be supported by reasons showing why notice

to opposite party would defeat the object of injunction under proviso to

Order XXXIX Rule 3,
CPC
. While passing afore order, Division Bench

of this Court remitted the application at hand back to learned Single

of
    Judge for fresh consideration and also permitted the defendants to file

reply to the application with further request to learned Single Judge to

decide the application expeditiously. In the aforesaid background,
                        rt
    application at hand came to be heard by this Court and same is now

being disposed of vide instant order.
5.            Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused

the material available on record, this Court finds that plaintiff was

granted suit patent on March 30, 2017 under
Section 43
of the

Patents Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') under IN'092

for     agricultural     composition       entitled         'AGRICULTURAL

COMPOSITION', for a term of 20 years and the product was launched

in the market under brand name 'TECHNO Z' in August, 2018.
However, subsequently it came to the notice of applicant/plaintiff that

the   suit   patent    has   been   infringed   by    the     defendants         by

manufacturing, marketing, and selling/offering for sale product under

the brand name of "SELZIC".
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
6
2026:HHC:26056
6.           Mr. Ashok Aggarwal,        learned Senior Advocate duly

assisted by Dr. Sanjay Kumar and Mr. Atul Jhingan, learned counsel

.
representing the applicant/plaintiff vehemently argued that by virtue of
Section 48
of the Act, a Patent granted under this Act, shall confer an

exclusive right upon the patentee to prevent third party, who do not

have its consent from the act of making, using, offering for sale,

of
    selling or importing such product in India and, therefore, applicant-
plaintiff, being exclusive patent holder, is entitled to file and maintain

present suit against infringement of Patent granted in its favour along
                       rt
    with application for interim directions.
In support of afore contention,

reliance came to be placed upon the judgment passed by Hon'ble

High Court of Delhi in
Novartis AG & Anr. v. Cipla Ltd.
2015

SCCOnLine Del 6430, wherein it came to be held that a patent holder

enjoys exclusive rights/ monopoly qua the patent and third party

cannot use the same, without the exclusive license.
7.           While making this Court peruse Patent Certificate

(Annexure-D at pages 8-9 of Plaintiff's documents) and Patent

Specification (Annexure-E at pages 10-36 of Plaintiff's documents) as

granted by Patent Office, Mr. Aggarwal, learned Senior Counsel

argued that plaintiff alone from the date of its being granted patent

qua the product in question has been exclusive right to make, use,

offer for sale, sell, import and/or export the product covered by the suit
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
7
2026:HHC:26056

patent and as such, acts of defendants of infringing the Plaintiff's suit

patent are causing and will continue to cause substantial financial loss

.
to the plaintiff and in case defendants were not restrained from their

acts of infringement of patent, irreparable injury would be caused to

the plaintiff.
8.               Mr. Aggarwal, further argued that if the Defendants are

of
    allowed to manufacture, offer for sale and/or sell the suit patented

product, it will not only infringe the suit patent but will also completely

defeat the purpose of the 'Product Patent regime' introduced by the
                          rt
    Act, which in turn will be adverse to the intention of the Legislature.
He submitted that defendants have attempted to take advantage of

research and development carried out by the plaintiff. He submitted

that suit patent is an old patent in its 14th year out of 20 years of

patent term which has stood the test of multiple pre-grant and post-
grant oppositions, and has successfully worked for significant number

of years. He further argued that defendants could have filed pre-grant

or post-grant oppositions qua the patent, but such procedure was

never adopted. He further argued that pre-grant and post-grant

oppositions filed by other parties were disposed of by the competent

authority taking note of all the evidence, prior art documents, written

submissions, reply and arguments advanced by the opposition. He

further argued that no revocation petition has been filed before the
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
8
2026:HHC:26056

erstwhile Intellectual Property Appellate Board (now dissolved) or

High Courts by the defendants on account of their being aggrieved by

.
the grant of patent in favour of the plaintiff. He submitted that it was

only as a defensive measure that once they were 'caught in the act' of

infringing the patent, they chose to assail its validity.
9.           Mr. Aggarwal, further contended that product is an

of
    invention under
Section 2(1)(j)
of the Act, which is comprised of an

effective amount of sulphur, an effective amount of zinc oxide and at

least one agrochemically acceptable excipient (Surfactant), having a
                        rt
    particle size of 0.1 micron to 50 microns, which provides a higher yield

and improves plant's physiology. He further argued that composition

demonstrates excellent dispersion, readily usable for micro irrigation

systems, which is not known to interested individuals and is a product

of years of research and development. To substantiate his aforesaid

submissions, he specifically
placed reliance upon
the affidavit of Dr.

Phool Kumar Patanjali, (Annexure-N at pages 196-294 of Plaintiff's

documents) who is a technical expert/scientist in the field of

agrochemical formulations, who after having perused the complete

specifications, including claims of Suit patent No. IN'092 opined that

defendants no. 2's product 'SELZIC' falls within the scope of claims of

IN'092. He submitted that as per affidavit of Dr. Patanjali, patent of the

plaintiff comprises of 12 claims, out of which claims 11 and 12 have
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
9
2026:HHC:26056

been found with essential features which have been infringed by

defendant no. 2.
.
10.           Mr. Aggarwal further argued that subject patent is a valid

patent which has been granted after detailed scrutiny and examination

by the patent office, being expert/competent authority by virtue of
Section 43
of the Act. He submitted that by now it is well settled that

of
    the Court when faced with a prayer for grant of an injunction in an

infringement suit must enquire whether the defendant has raised 'a

credible challenge', meaning thereby that once a patent is granted,
                         rt
    the onus to make out a credible challenge as to its validity would rest

squarely on the party challenging it i.e., the defendants. He submitted

that since defendants have failed to lay a valid credible challenge to

validity of the patent, coupled with the fact that patent has remained

valid, unchallenged and reduced into practice for several years, the

presumption of prima facie validity weighs in favour of the plaintiff.
In

support of his aforesaid claim, he
placed reliance upon
the judgment

passed by Hon'ble High Court Delhi in case titled
FMC Corporation

Vs Best Crop
. Science, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 3647.
11.          To the contrary, Ms. Devyani Sharma, learned Senior

Advocate duly assisted by Mr. Vipul Sharda, learned counsel

appearing for defendants No.2 and 3, argued that Court lacks

territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present suit and by now it is well
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
10
2026:HHC:26056

settled that prayer of interim injunction can be denied in case Courts

arrives at conclusion that it has no territorial jurisdiction to try the suit.
.
In support of her aforesaid submission, Ms. Devyani Sharma, learned

Senior counsel representing defendants No.2 and 3
placed reliance

upon
the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled
Asma

Lateef and another vs. Shabbir and others
, (2024) 4 SCC, 696,

of
    wherein it came to be held that question of jurisdiction assumes

significant importance even at the stage a Court considers the

question of grant of interim relief.
Reliance is also placed upon the
                         rt
    judgment passed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case titled
New

Life Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. vs. Dr. Ilyas New Life Homeo and

Herbals Pvt. Limited CS(COMM
) 323 of 2023.
12.          Ms.     Devyani     Sharma,      learned       Senior       counsel

vehemently argued that since suit at hand is based solely on three

invoices of purported isolated purchases of defendant no. 2's product

from a single retailer i.e. defendant no. 1, these purchases are trap

purchases from an unauthorized dealer and cannot be made basis to

create jurisdiction. She submitted that since the infringing product

'SELZIC" is a commodity regulated by Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1985

(hereinafter FCO), and defendant No. 2 has already obtained

permission to market the product in certain States, which does not

include the State of Himachal, defendant No. 2 and 3 cannot be made
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
11
2026:HHC:26056

to suffer on the basis of these three isolated purchases done by an

unrelated party i.e. defendant No.1. She submitted that these trap

.
purchases were orchestrated just to create jurisdiction where same

does not exist, thus, prayer of interim injunction deserves to be

rejected. While further elaborating upon her submissions with regard to

territorial jurisdiction, Ms. Devyani Sharma, further submitted that

of
    defendants No.2 and 3 are situate outside the territorial jurisdiction of

this Court and in cases where several defendants are impleaded and

only some reside within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court,
Section 20
rt
(b)
CPC
mandates that plaintiff has to seek leave of the Court to proceed

against all the defendants, whereas in the instant case, no such leave

has been sought by the plaintiff to proceed with the present suit.
13.          Ms. Devyani Sharma, learned Senior counsel further

argued that territorial jurisdiction of this Court is sought to be invoked

on the basis of three isolated purchases of the product of defendants

no. 2 and 3 from defendant no. 1's shop in Tehsil Rohru on 9th and

11th December, 2023 (Annexure L-Colly at pages 188-190 of plaintiff's

documents) but bare perusal of the same clearly reveals that alleged

purchases are ex facie bogus, illegal and unauthorized.                        She

submitted that defendant no. 1 had no authority to sell the product

"SELZIC" and that these are false transactions/ trap purchases

intended to falsely create jurisdiction where none exists. She

submitted that fertilizers are regulated commodities and separate
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
12
2026:HHC:26056

state-level authorizations are required to sell the product.             Since

Defendant no. 3 does not have any licence for the State of Himachal

.
Pradesh and does not sell in the State of Himachal Pradesh, same

could not have been sold by defendant No.1, a retailer without first

obtaining authorization for sale from the Notified Authority. She

submitted that to get such authorization, the retailer is required to

of
    submit a memorandum of intimation in Form A-1 alongwith an

authorization from the source Certificate of Source in Form O as

prescribed in FCO [Clause 8(2)]. She submitted that if a retailer
                        rt
    obtains fertilizers for sale from different sources, then certificate of

source is required from each such source as provided under forth

proviso to Clause 8(3) of FCO (Document no. 9 at pages 48-54 of

Defendants' documents). She submitted that neither Defendant no. 2

nor Defendant no. 3 has authorized Defendant no. 1 to sell 'SELZIC'

nor they supplied 'SELZIC' to Defendant no. 1.
14.         Ms.    Devyani     Sharma,     learned       Senior       counsel

representing defendants No.2 and 3 also referred to the order dated

26.04.2024 passed by this Court, wherein it came to be recorded that

defendant No.1 has adopted the contents of the written statement of

defendants No.2 and 3. She submitted that where defendants No.2

and 3 have explicitly stated that they have not supplied 'SELZIC' to

defendant No.1 and as such assertion made by them have been
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
13
2026:HHC:26056

accepted by defendant No.1, by no stretch of imagination it can be

said that defendant No.1 had any authority to sell the product

.
"SELZIC". She submitted that since afore product was being sold

unauthorizedly without there being any authority, coupled with the fact

that there is no evidence adduced on record suggestive of the fact

that product "SELZIC" was made available by defendants No.2 and 3

of
    to defendant No.1 for sale, this Court cannot be said to have territorial

jurisdiction to entertain the suit filed by the plaintiff qua infringement of

suit patent. She submitted that sham and unlawful transactions which
                        rt
    are either of a counterfeit product or are false transactions cannot be

made basis to create jurisdiction. While placing reliance upon the

judgment passed Hon'ble Delhi High Court in case titled
Indovax

Private Limited vs. Merck Animal Health and others
, 2017 SCC

OnLine Del 9393, Ms. Devyani Sharma, learned Senior counsel

argued that isolated trap purchases cannot be used to procure

jurisdiction, and sales by defendants at commercial scale within the

territorial jurisdiction must be shown. She further submitted that

listings of product on the website of Defendant no. 3 does not show

that the product could be purchased in Himachal Pradesh, rather

defendant No.3 was authorized to sell only in five States- Gujarat,

Maharashtra, U.P., M.P., and Rajasthan, and could therefore, sell the

product only in these 5 states (Document no. 5 at pages 32-41 of
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
14
2026:HHC:26056

Defendants' documents). She submitted that only a person situated in

these States could place orders for SELZIC on Defendant no. 3's

.
website. She submitted that website screenshots produced by the

plaintiff show that the States selected for delivery were U.P., and

Maharashtra and no order has been shown to be placed on the

website from HP or for delivery to HP, therefore, these listings cannot

of
    assist the plaintiff in invoking jurisdiction of this Court (Annexure-M

Colly at pages 191-194 of Plaintiff's documents).
15.         While responding to the purported listing on Indiamart
                      rt
    website, Ms. Devyani Sharma, learned Senior Counsel vehemently

argued that a mere listing on Indiamart does not by itself confer

jurisdiction because Indiamart is an interactive website on which

orders can not directly be placed, rather same is only a platform which

connects buyers and sellers and is like a directory where a

prospective buyer can find the contact details of the supplier in

respect of a listing of any product. She submitted that only because

one can access Indiamart website across the country does not mean

that jurisdiction can be created simply by accessing the website.
However, in the case at hand nothing has been placed on record to

show that there was any actual transaction affected between any

buyer and any Defendants No. 2 and 3 in Himachal Pradesh through

Indiamart.
In support of her aforesaid submissions, she placed
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
15
2026:HHC:26056

reliance upon the judgments passed by Hon'ble High Court Delhi, in

case titled
Banyan Tree Holding Private Limited vs. A. Murali
.
Krishna Reddy and another, 2009 SCC OnLine Delhi 3780 and

Vikrant Chemico Industries Private Limited vs. Shri Gopal

Engineering and Chemical Works Private Limited and others
,

2025 SCC OnLine Delhi, 5562.
of
16.          Ms.    Devyani    Sharma,     learned       Senior       counsel

representing the defendants no. 2 and 3 argued that judgment passed

by this Court dated 06.0.6.2025 in
SML Ltd. Vs. Mohan & Company
rt
    and another. COMS No.6 of 2023 is distinguishable. She submitted

that though issue of territorial jurisdiction was considered in afore

judgment, but same was on different facts. There was no admission

by the retailer (Defendant no. 1
in that case
) that the manufacturer

(Defendant no. 2
in that case
) had neither authorized the retailer nor

supplied the product to the retailer. She submitted that in afore case

defendants had allegedly a manufacturing unit in Himachal Pradesh

and the provisions of FCO pertaining to grant of authorization to sell to

a retailer based on submissions of Certificate of Source in Form O

received from the manufacturer or wholesaler were not considered.
17.          Though, learned Senior counsel representing defendants,

in addition to her aforesaid submissions with regard to territorial

jurisdiction, also made detailed submissions/rebuttal to persuade this
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
16
2026:HHC:26056

Court that no prima facie case of infringement is made out, but having

taken note of the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Asma

.
Lateef
(supra), wherein it specifically came to be ruled that where

interim relief is claimed in a suit before a civil court and party to be

affected by grant of such relief, or any other party to suit, raises a

point of maintainability thereof or that it is barred by law and also

of
    contends on that basis that interim relief should not to be granted,

grant of relief in whatever form, if at all, ought to be preceded by

formation and recording of at least a prima facie satisfaction that suit
                       rt
    is maintainable or that it is not barred by law, this Court at first

instance finds it appropriate to deal with the question of lack of

territorial jurisdiction raised at the behest of the defendants.
18.          Precisely, the claim of the plaintiff is that infringement of

the plaintiff's suit patent has taken place within the jurisdiction of this

Court. To prove aforesaid claim, heavy reliance is placed upon

invoices available at pages 188-190 of the plaintiff's document,

whereby allegedly defendant No.1 has sold the infringing product

"SELZIC" manufactured and marketed by defendant No.2. In addition

to afore, it is also claimed by the plaintiff that infringing product is

being marketed, offered for sale and sold across the country online

through various third-party websites, thus the cause of action has

substantively arisen within the jurisdiction of the present Court. It is
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
17
2026:HHC:26056

also claimed by the plaintiff that since defendant No.1's principal place

of business as well as Administrative Office falls within the jurisdiction

.
of this Court, coupled with the fact that GST details of defendant

No.1's principal place of business falls within the jurisdiction of this

Court and that it works for gain within the territorial jurisdiction of this

Court, this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the case at

of
    hand.
19.          While refuting the assertion of defendants No. 2 and 3

that they are unrelated entities and that defendant No.1 is not their
                       rt
    authorized seller/dealer, it is clarified that only relevant fact in this

context is that the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of

this Court. It is also claimed at the behest of the plaintiff that alleged

complicity of the defendants in illegal acts in areas where it is not

authorized to do so cannot be used as a shield to try and dislodge the

jurisdiction of this Court, rather admission on the part of the

defendants that they are marketing and selling the products in states

where they are allegedly not permitted to do so is a ground to cancel

the license/permission granted to defendant No.2 under the Fertilizer

(Control) Order, 1985 issued under the
Essential Commodities Act,

1955
. It is also claimed by the plaintiff that even assuming that

defendant No.1 sold the goods without the express authorization of

defendants No.2 and 3, it is for defendants No.2 and 3 to demonstrate
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
18
2026:HHC:26056

that the same occurred despite their having exercised due diligence

and comprehensive oversight, all of which are a matter of trial in such

.
proceedings.
20.         Careful perusal of the reply to the application at hand and

written statement to the main suit reveal that defendants No.2 and 3

are unrelated entities, each being a distinct legal entity and

of
    functioning entirety independently from the other. The Mitul Industries

make the product in question that sold by ULink under the brand

'SELZIC'. Mitul Industries is a manufacturer and supplier of a wide
                      rt
    range of sulphur based fertilizers and fungicides such as Sulphur 90%

power fertilizer, zincated bentonite sulphur (Sulphur 65% + zinc 18%),

sulphur micronutrient & Sea Weed based PGR Gell, etc. Mitul

Industries has been a manufacturer in this industry since 1998 and is

also recognized as an accredited member of the Pesticide Association

of India, having its registered office at 1, Kasturi Park, New Maneklal

Estate, L.B.S. Marg, Ghatkopar (W), Mumbai. ULink is an Indian

Private Limited Company primarily engaged in wholesale of fertilizers,

having its registered office at Office Nos. 001 and 002, Ground Floor

Wing, "A" and Nos. 003 and 004 Ground Floor Wing "B" Nyayi Tech

Park, Wadgaon Sheri, Pune. ULink is also the owner of the brand and

registered proprietor of the trademark "SELZIC" registered under

Class 1 bearing registration number 535705 (Document No.2
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
19
2026:HHC:26056

available at page No.8-9 of defendants' documents).              In the year

2021, Mitul Industries entered into an agreement with ULink, whereby

.
they were permitted to market and manufacture the fertilizer as

mentioned above, under the brand name of "SELZIC". Since 2021,

ULink has been authorized to and is offering for sale and selling the

aforementioned fertilizer under the brand name of "SELZIC" to its

of
    distributors and customers in five states i.e. Gujarat, Maharashtra,

Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. ULink also sells the

said product through its distributors and retail network of Saathi
                       rt
    Stores present in the five States that it is authorized to sell. Since

fertilizers are regulated by the Fertilizer (Inorganic, Organic or Mixed)

(Control) Order 1985 ('FCO") made by the Central Government under

the
Essential Commodities Act, 1955
, every person including

manufacturer, importer, a pool handling agency, wholesaler and a

retail dealer intending to sell or offer for sale or carrying on the

business of selling the fertilizer is required to make a Memorandum of

Intimation to the State Government in Form A1 alongwith a certificate

of source in Form O. On receipt of the complete memorandum, the

State Government shall issue an acknowledgment of receipt in Form

A-2. The Mitul Industries has the requisite licenses under the FCO to

manufacture fertilizers (Documents No.4 at pages 25 to 31 of

defendants' documents). ULink has the requisite authorization letter
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
20
2026:HHC:26056

under the FCO to sell fertilizers only in 5 States i.e., Gujarat,

Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh,

.
meaning thereby product "SELZIC" cannot be sold by Mitul Industries

save and except in five States, as detailed hereinabove.
21.           Specific objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction has

been raised by the defendants No.2 and 3. It is averred in the reply to

of
    the application as well as written statement that (a) defendants No. 2

and 3 do not reside in the State of Himachal Pradesh,(b) they are not

selling in the State of Himachal Pradesh, (c) they have not sold the
                        rt
    infringing product to defendant No.1 or any other dealer in the State of

Himachal Pradesh and (d) even if defendant No.1 sold the allegedly

infringing product in Himachal Pradesh, it was an illegal sale by an

unauthorized person with no permission or license to market or

distribute or sell defendants No.2 and 3 product and defendant No.1

has been falsely implicated in the present suit only to invoke the

jurisdiction of this Court.
22.           At this stage, it is important to take note of the fact that

notice in the main suit was also issued to defendant No.1. On

26.04.2024, Sh. Rajesh Kashyap, Advocate appeared on behalf of

defendant No.1 and made a statement that he shall adopt the written

statement filed on behalf of defendants No.2 and 3 and the written

statement filed by aforesaid defendants may also be treated as written
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
21
2026:HHC:26056

statement on behalf of defendant No.1. This Court, after having

recorded statement of above named counsel, granted four weeks'

.
time to the plaintiff to file replication as well as rejoinder to the stay

application.
23.            At first instance, this Court vide order dated 12.01.2024,

proceeded to grant ad interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff,

of
    thereby restraining the defendants, but subsequently afore order was

taken into appeal before the Division Bench of this Court and order

passed on 12.01.2024 was set-aside and matter was remitted back to
                         rt
    this Court for fresh consideration. Even in proceedings pending before

the Division Bench of this Court, defendant No.1 did not appear. Since

specific statement came to be made at the behest of defendant No.1

that it be permitted to adopt the written statement filed by defendants

No.2 and 3, this Court is persuaded to agree with Ms. Devyani

Sharma, learned Senior counsel representing defendants No.2 and 3

that it stands established on record that afore defendants No.2 and 3

had not sold the infringing product to defendant No.1 and sale of the

infringing product, if any, by defendant No.1 is an illegal sale by an

unauthorized person with no permission or license to market,

distribute or sell defendants No.2 and 3's product.
24.            Though, it came to be strenuously argued by learned

Senior counsel representing defendants No.2 and 3 that bare perusal
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
22
2026:HHC:26056

of invoices, available at page Nos. 188 to 190 of the plaintiff's

documents, adduced on record by the plaintiff suggests sale of

.
infringing product by defendant No.1, but this Court is of the view that

same may not be of much relevance for the reason that defendant

No.1 by adopting the written statement filed on behalf of defendants

No.2 and 3 has admitted that he was not authorized by defendants

of
    No.2 and 3 to sell infringing product and sale shown to have been

made in the State of Himachal Pradesh is an illegal sale by an

unauthorized person with no permission or licence to market or
                        rt
    distribute or sell defendants No.2 and 3's product. Since defendant

No.1 has neither specifically denied the factum of his having made the

sale of the infringing product in the State of Himachal Pradesh nor

made any claim that he has been falsely implicated in the present suit

only with a view to invoke territorial jurisdiction of this Court, this Court

is persuaded to conclude at this stage that invoices available at page

Nos. 188 to 190 of the plaintiff's document have been adduced on

record solely with a view to invoke jurisdiction of this Court, which

actually does not have territorial jurisdiction for so many other reason

as would be spelt out hereinafter.
25.          No doubt, it would be determined during trial whether

invoices qua the sale of infringing product were actually issued by

defendant No.1 or not. However, even if it is assumed that the
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
23
2026:HHC:26056

invoices were issued by defendant No.1, mere production thereof

would not, by itself, be sufficient to confer territorial jurisdiction upon

.
this Court once defendant No.1 has taken categorical stand before

this Court by way of adopting written statement filed on behalf of

defendants No. 2 and 3 that it was not authorized to sell infringing

product of defendants No.2 and 3 in the State of Himachal Pradesh

of
    and sale, if any, made by it of infringing product in Himachal Pradesh

was illegal sale by an unauthorized person with no permission or

license to market or distribute the infringing produce. Mere production
                         rt
    of invoices, as detailed hereinabove, would not be sufficient to

conclude territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the instant

application.
26.            At this stage, it is apt to mention that while considering

the jurisdictional objection to determine the grant/denial of an interim

injunction, the standard under
Order 7 Rule 10 CPC
does not apply,

meaning thereby Court is not restricted to merely the averments in the

plaint, nor is the Court bound to assume the plaint averments to be

true. Territorial jurisdiction of this Court has been sought to be invoked

on the basis of three alleged isolated purchases of the product of

Defendants no. 2 and 3 from Defendant 1's shop in Tehsil Rohru.
However, having carefully perused aforesaid invoices, coupled with

the stand taken by defendant No.1, this Court at this stage is
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
24
2026:HHC:26056

persuaded to infer that these three alleged purchases appears to

have been created with a view to create jurisdiction of this Court.
.
27.          Besides above, this Court is also persuaded to agree with

learned Senior counsel representing defendants No.2 and 3 that

fertilizers being regulated commodities cannot be sold by defendant

No.1, a retailer without obtaining authorization for sale from the

of
    Notified Agency. Clauses 8(2) and 8(3) of FCO reveal that every

person, including a manufacturer, importer, pool handling agency,

wholesaler or retail dealer, intending to sell or offer for sale fertilizers
                       rt
    is required to submit a Memorandum of Intimation in Form A1, along

with the prescribed fee and a certificate of source in Form O, to the

Notified Authority. Upon receipt of such Memorandum, the Notified

Authority is obliged to issue an acknowledgement in Form A2, which

is deemed to be an authorization letter, thereby recognizing the

concerned person as an authorized dealer for the purposes of the

Fertilizer (Control) Order. If a retailer obtains fertilizers for sale from

different sources, then certificate of source is required from each such

source (Forth Proviso to Clause 8(3) of FCO). Neither Defendants no.
2 and. 3 have authorized Defendant no. 1 to sell "SELZIC" by issuing

a Certificate of source in Form O to Defendant no. 1, nor there is any

material to show that defendants No. 2 and 3 have supplied infringing

product to defendant No.1, which fact otherwise has been admitted by
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
25
2026:HHC:26056

defendant No.1 by adopting the written statement filed by defendants

No. 2 and 3. With the adoption of written statement filed by

.
defendants No.2 and 3, defendant No.1 has virtually proved the claim

of the plaintiff that all the three alleged instances of sale by defendant

No.1 are not the product of defendants No.2 and 3, rather same are

totally unauthorized and unlawful.
of
28.           Moreover, by now it is well settled that isolated trap

purchases cannot be used to procure jurisdiction, and sales by

defendants at commercial scale within the territorial jurisdiction must
                         rt
    be shown. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the judgment passed

by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in
Indovax Private Limited
(supra)

wherein it has been held as under:-
"24. In Glen (supra) case, this Court has clearly held that one or two
           transactions is not sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Court and sale has to
           be on a commercial scale. In this case, the Court has also held that mere

supply of the goods to individual purchaser for use is not sufficient to give
           jurisdiction to the Court as in such cases; the probability of public being

deceived would not be present. The law laid down by this Court in this
           case clearly shows that unless the sale is on the commercial scale, it can-
           not be said that the cause of action for passing off has arisen in favour of

the plaintiff within the jurisdiction of this Court.
In the case of
Banyan Tree
           Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy
, (2010) 42 PTC 361 (Del),
           this Court formulated the various questions including question no.(iii) in pa-
           ra 7 which is "Is it permissible for the plaintiff to establish such prima facie
           case through "trap orders" or "trap transactions?" and proceeded to an-
           swer it in the following manner:--
57. Reverting to the present case, the position that emerges
                      from the above judicial decisions is that while in trade mark and
                      infringement cases, trap orders or trap transactions may be
                      used as evidence, the fairness of such transactions is a rele-
                      vant factor to be considered. Other relevant factors would be
                      the nature of goods or services offered for purchase on the in-
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
26
2026:HHC:26056

ternet. If they require the customer to further physically verify their
                quality then the mere purchase of such goods through a trap transac-
                tion may not be treated as being sufficient evidence of infringement.
                The facts of each case will determine whether the trap transaction is a

.
fair one and has resulted in a purchase on the internet of goods or

services. A lone trap transaction will not be sufficient evidence of in-
                fringement or passing off. For the purposes of establishing that a part
                of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court, the
                Plaintiff would have to show that the Defendant has purposefully

availed of the jurisdiction of the forum court by entering into a com-
                mercial transaction with an internet user located within the jurisdiction
                of the forum court. This cannot possibly be a solitary trap transaction

of
                since that would not be an instance of "purposeful" availment by the
                Defendant. It would have to be a real commercial transaction that the
                Defendant has with someone not set up by the Plaintiff itself. If the on-
                ly evidence is in the form of a series of trap transactions, they have to
                   rt
                be shown to be obtained using fair means. The Plaintiff seeking to es-
                tablish jurisdiction on the basis of such trap transactions would have
                to aver unambiguously in the plaint, and also place along with it sup-
porting material, to prima facie show that the trap transactions relied
                upon satisfy the above test. Question (iii) is answered accordingly."
25. So even if the plaintiff relies on a trap transaction it is required to show that the
    defendants are indulging into commercial sale of its product. The question what

constitute a commercial transaction or sale is dealt with by Madras High Court
    in
Smithkline French Laboratories Limited v. Indoco Remedies Ltd.
, (2001) 21
    PTC 672 (Mad), wherein it held:--
"6. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent stated that only if

the goods have been sold through a stockist or distributor or dealer of
                the respondent, then alone it can be construed as a commercial sale

on the part of the respondent, so as to give jurisdiction to the
                court. Nowhere in the plaint it is stated that such a commercial sale is
                carried on in the City of Madras by the respondent. Perusal of the

cause of action paragraph also indicates that no such averment is
                there to show that the respondent had authorised the stockist or dis-
                tributor or dealer in the City of Chennai. Hence, it is stated that the
                sale of the product by any other unauthorised person would not confer
                any jurisdiction in this court. I am of the view that there is some force
                in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent."
(emphasis supplied)
26.
In
Himachal Pradesh Horticulture Produce Marketing and Processing
    Corporation Ltd. v. Mohan Meakin Breweries Limited
, (1981) 1 PTC 74
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
27
2026:HHC:26056

(P&H), the Court while dealing with the question of jurisdiction in cases of
    passing off has held as under:--
"9. In a case of present nature, the cause of action partly or
               wholly can arise in a given jurisdiction only if it is the defendant

.
who is proved to have directly made sale of the goods under

the impugned trade mark (within the jurisdiction of a given
               Court) not to an individual consumer but to a distributor or a
               wholesaler or a retailer and that such a sale should be at a

commercial scale. If this much is not insisted upon, then the de-
fendant can be dragged into litigation in any part of the country
               by only adducing flimsy kind of evidence that has been adduced
               in the present case by a company which has its head office of

of
               Solan in Himachal Pradesh where the defendant too have their
               head office and where it was convenient to the plaintiff to pros-
               ecute the suit and to the defendant to defend the suit. A big firm
               like Mohan Meakin Breweries Limited has its ramification all
                 rt
               over the country and it is easy for it to have dragged this public
               corporation into litigation even at a far off pace like Kanya Ku-
               mari if the only evidence necessary to give jurisdiction to that

Court was of purchasing of a few bottles by any agent of Mohan
               Meakin Limited from someone locally there."
(emphasis supplied)
27. The Supreme Court in
Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi
, (2006) 32 PTC 1

(SC) has also clearly held as under:--
"43.
In
Patel Field Marshal Industries v. P.M. Diesels Ltd.
again
               the thrust was on the sale of products and/or advertisement by

the Appellant for registration of trade marks in the Trade Marks
               Journal and other local papers. The Division Bench of the High

Court, as has been noticed hereinbefore, did not advert to the
               issue as to whether the defendant had been selling its product
               in Delhi on commercial scale or not. It is, therefore, not neces-
               sary for us also to dilate further on the said question. We have

furthermore noticed hereinbefore that the advertisement ap-
               pearing in a journal or newspapers by itself would not confer
               any jurisdiction on the court, if it otherwise did not have any."
28. In the plaint, the plaintiff has nowhere alleged that the defendant has
    any authorized distributor, dealer or stockiest in Delhi. The plaintiff only
    averred "that the Defendants through their small time agents are even
    paddling their products in Delhi." Also, in the paragraph where the plaintiff
    has pleaded that this Court has the jurisdiction, it only says that the said
    "product is available for purchase in Delhi".
29. The plaintiff in para 43 of its amended plaint has alleged that cause of
    action arisen in favour of the plaintiff on 05.06.2013 when it asked the de-
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
28
2026:HHC:26056

fendants through a notice dated 28.05.2013 to desist from selling its prod-
    uct and its reply dated 14.06.2013. The plaintiff has also contended that
    the cause of action has also arisen in May 2013 when a poultry owner
    complained about the sub-standard vaccine manufactured by the defen-
.
dants, believing it to that of the plaintiff. There is no document on record to

show that the said poultry farm owner has purchased the vaccine of the
    defendants in Delhi from any dealer, authorized representative or agents
    of the defendants. The plaintiff has also alleged that the cause of action
    has arisen in his favour when the defendants advertised on its website that

they are manufacturing the vaccine and also when they learnt that the de-
    fendants have fraudulently obtained the registration of their trademark. As
    discussed above, the defendants are the owner of the registered trade-
of
    mark and the plaintiff has already dropped his relief of infringement of its
    trademark. It is required to prima facie show that the defendants are in-
    dulging into commercial activity of sale of its product which the plaintiff
    claims is deceptively similar to its trademark within the jurisdiction of this
    Court. One of the contentions is that the defendants have put an adver-
rt
    tisement informing the poultry world about its product in the name of "IN-
    NOVAX" which has been accessed by anyone in Delhi and, therefore, the

part of the cause of action can be said to have arisen within the jurisdiction
    of this Court. However, the plaintiff has not produced any sufficient evi-
    dence except the transaction it has relied upon, to show that the defen-
    dants are selling their products in Delhi. As regards the cause of action
    dated 08.08.2013, it relates to the cancellation of trademark registration of

defendants.
30.
In
Banyan Tree
case (supra), this Court has held that posting of an ad-
    vertisement depicting its mark is not sufficient to give cause of action for

passing off unless it enables the defendants to enter into any commercial
    transaction with the viewer in the forum state. The Court has held as un-

der:--
45. This court holds that in order to prima facie establish that
               the Defendant purposefully availed of the jurisdiction of this

court, the Plaintiff would have to show that the Defendant en-
gaged in some commercial activity in the forum State by target-
               ing its website specifically at customers within that State. This is
               consistent with the law
laid down in
Cybersell and reiterated
               later in Toys R Us. It is also consistent with the application of
               the 'tighter' version of the 'effects' test which is 'targeting'. In
               any action for passing off or infringement, it would have to be
               shown that the Defendant by using its mark intended to pass off
               its goods as that of the Plaintiff's. A mere hosting of a website
               which can be accessible from anyone from within the jurisdic-
               tion of the court is not sufficient for this purpose. Also a mere
               posting of an advertisement by the Defendant depicting its mark
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
29
2026:HHC:26056

on a passive website which does not enable the Defendant to
              enter into any commercial transaction with the viewer in the fo-
              rum state cannot satisfy the requirement of giving rise to a
              cause of action in the forum state. Even an interactive website,

.
which is not shown to be specifically targeted at viewers in the

forum state for commercial transactions, will not result in the
              court of the forum state having jurisdiction. In sum, for the pur-
              poses of
Section 20(c)
CPC, in order to show that some part of
              the cause of action has arisen in the forum state by the use of

the internet by the Defendant, the Plaintiff will have to show
              prima facie that the said website, whether euphemistically
              termed as "passive plus" or "interactive", was specifically tar-
of
              geted at viewers in the forum state for commercial transactions.
              The Plaintiff would have to plead this and produce material to
              prima facie show that some commercial transaction using the
              website was entered into by the Defendant with a user of its
              website within the forum state and that the specific targeting of
                 rt
              the forum state by the Defendant resulted in an injury or harm
              to the Plaintiff within the forum state. Question no. (ii) is ans-
wered accordingly. Question (iii) Is it permissible for the Plaintiff
              to establish such prima facie case through "trap orders" or "trap
              transactions"?
31.
In the case of
Sholay Media Entertainment v. Yogesh Patel, ILR
(2010)

Supp. (1) Delhi 11, this Court held in para 17 read as under:--
"17. As to what are the principles applicable for a court to dis-
              cern that particular internet based causes of action subsist in a
              suit, has been spelt out in a recent Division Bench of this Court,

in
Banyan Tree Holding Ltd. v. Murali Krishna Reddy Suit No.
894/2009, decided on a reference to the Division Bench on the

issue of jurisdiction, on 23.11.2009. The Court held that:
38. Having surveyed the law as it has developed in different ju-
risdictions, this Court is of the view that the essential principles

developed as part of the common law can be adopted without
              difficulty by our courts in determining whether the forum court
              has jurisdiction where the alleged breach is related to an activity
              on the internet. At the outset, this Court does not subscribe to
              the view that the mere accessibility of the Defendants website
              in Delhi would enable this Court to exercise jurisdiction. A pas-
              sive website, with no intention to specifically target audiences
              outside the State where the host of the website is located, can-
              not vest the forum court with jurisdiction. This Court is therefore
              unable to agree with the proposition
laid down in
Casio. The
              said decision cannot be held to be good law and to that extent
              is overruled.
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
30
2026:HHC:26056
39. India TV appears to be somewhat closer to the develop-
        ment of law in this regard since the decision in Casio. In India
        TV, the learned single Judge impliedly doubted the correctness
        of the decision in Casio. The learned single Judge in India TV

.
acknowledged that a mere accessibility of website may not be

sufficient to attract jurisdiction of the forum court. This, in the
        considered view of this Court, is the correct position in law.
40. There was no occasion for this Court even in India TV to

examine the finer aspects of the question of jurisdiction based
        on the nature of the website, the intention of the host of the
        website to specifically target viewers outside its jurisdiction, and
        the effect of hosting such website on audiences outside such

of
        state. It appears to this Court that for the purposes of a passing
        off action or an action for infringement where the plaintiffs is not
        carrying on business within the jurisdiction of the forum court,
        and where there is no long arm statute, the plaintiffs would have
          rt
        to show that the Defendant purposefully availed itself of the ju-
        risdiction of the forum court. It is not enough merely to show
        that the website hosted by the Defendant is an interactive one.
It would have to be shown that the nature of the activity in-
        dulged in by the Defendant by the use of the website was with
        an intention to conclude a commercial transaction with the web-
        site user.
41. This Court is not able to accept the submission of the
        learned Counsel for the plaintiffs that the test of "purposeful
        availment" must be replaced by the test of "purposeful avoid-
        ance". While the Defendant may in his defence show how he

avoided the forum state, the initial burden is on the plaintiffs to
        show that the Defendant "purposefully availed" itself of the ju-
risdiction of the forum court. The issue of incorporating filters to
        block access to the website by viewers located outside the fo-
        rum state will have to be considered while deciding if the De-
fendant had "purposefully avoided" the forum state. However,
        that question will arise only if the plaintiffs have been able to
        show that the website of the Defendant is interactive and per-
        mits commercial transactions to be concluded by the Defendant
        with a user of the website.
42. This Court holds that jurisdiction of the forum court does not
        get attracted merely on the basis of interactivity of the website
        which is accessible in the forum state. The degree of the inte-
        ractivity apart, the nature of the activity permissible and whether
        it results in a commercial transaction has to be examined. For
        the "effects" test to apply, the plaintiffs must necessarily plead
        and show prima facie that the specific targeting of the forum
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
31
2026:HHC:26056

state by the Defendant resulted in an injury or harm to the plain-
              tiffs within the forum state. For the purposes of a passing off or
              an infringement action (where the plaintiffs is not located within
              the jurisdiction of the court), the injurious effect on the plaintiff's

.
business, goodwill or reputation within the forum state as a re-
sult of the Defendants website being accessed in the forum
              state would have to be shown. Naturally therefore, this would
              require the presence of the plaintiffs in the forum state and not
              merely the possibility of such presence in the future. Secondly,

to show that an injurious effect has been felt by the plaintiffs it
              would have to be shown that viewers in the forum state were
              specifically targeted. Therefore the "effects" test would have to

of
              be applied in conjunction with the "sliding scale" test to deter-
              mine if the forum court has jurisdiction to try a suit concerning
              internet based disputes.
In a subsequent judgment, the Karnataka High Court,
                 rt
              in
Presteege Property Developers Ltd. v. Prestige Estates
              Projects Ltd. MFA No.
494 & 13696/2006) applied the rule indi-
              cated in Banyan Tree, and further held that mere "booking" or

placing an order through internet is insufficient, to say that any
              transaction takes place, since the contract formation is not at
              the place of booking or ordering the product or service. Thus, it
              is held that the mere existence of a web site, without further

proof of the effect thereof (Ref. Banyan Tree's formulation that
              the plaintiffs has "to show that an injurious effect has been felt"
and it "would have to be shown that viewers in the forum state
              were specifically targeted.") does not clothe this Court with terri-
torial jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. The Court is also
              satisfied that the solitary sale of a CD, is insufficient to say that

the defendants "targeted" the Delhi markets. Concededly, both
              parties do not have any business or commercial office within
              the jurisdiction of the Court; the plaintiffs even applied to the

Registrar of Companies in Chennai, for relief against the defen-
              dants. On both the factual foundation claiming that this Court
              has jurisdiction, the materials are insufficient to justify continua-
              tion of the suit."
32. This Court has also laid down the same proposition in the case
    of (
India TV) Independent News v. India Broadcast Live Llc
(2007) 35 PTC
    177 Del. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced as under:--
"44. Learned Counsel referred to the provisions of
Section 20
of
              the said code to contend that this court has jurisdiction in the
              present matter. The said provision reads as under:
20. Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or
              cause of action arises.
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
32
2026:HHC:26056

Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted
                in Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction-
(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are
                more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit,

.
actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or per-
sonally works for gain; or
(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at
                the time of the commencement of the suit actually and volunta-
rily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain,
                provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given,
                or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or
                personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institu-
of
                tion; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
                [Explanation].-A corporation shall be deemed to carry on busi-
                ness at its sole or principal office in [India] or, in respect of any
                  rt
                cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subor-
                dinate office, at such place."
"46. As regards the exercise of personal jurisdiction in cases in-
                volving Internet activities, the position appears to be that mere
                'passive' posting of a website does not give jurisdiction to the
                court within whose jurisdiction, the complainant company is

present. Thus, personal jurisdiction cannot be exercised over
                non-residents merely because their website is accessible within
                the jurisdiction of the court. There has to be something more to
                indicate purposeful direction of activity to the forum state in a

substantial way. In Cybersell Inc. case (supra) limited interactiv-
                ity of the website restricted to received browser's name and ex-
pression of interest but not signing up for the services provided
                was not considered to be sufficient for the exercise of jurisdic-
                tion."
33. There is no averment in the plaint to even prima facie show that
    through its website the defendants are indulging into any commercial activ-
    ity within jurisdiction of this Court. To give jurisdiction to this Court, it is im-
    perative upon the plaintiff to prima facie show by way of its averment in the
    plaint duly supported by the documents that the defendants are indulging
    either by itself or through their agents or distributors in the commercial ac-
    tivity within the jurisdiction of this Court which amounts to passing off of
    the goods of the plaintiff. In the present case, in para 44, the plaintiff only
    states that the goods of the defendants are available for sale in Delhi but
    this averment is not supported by any documentary evidence. There is no
    averment that the defendants are selling their products in Delhi through
    their authorized agent, distributors etc. On the other hand, the events of
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
33
2026:HHC:26056

the case clearly show that the plaintiff is indulging into the forum hunting.
           Initially, when it filed its plaint, it relied on one Invoice of Balvinder Medical
           Hall dated October 5, 2013 to prima facie show that the defendants' were
           selling their goods in Delhi."
.
29.           Documents adduced on record by the plaintiff suggest

that infringing product is listed on the website of defendant No.3, but

there is nothing on record to prove that afore product has been or is

being sold by defendants No. 2 and 3 in the State of Himachal

of
    Pradesh. Moreover, defendant No.3 is authorized to sell only in five

States i.e.      Gujarat, Maharashtra, U.P., M.P., and Rajasthan and
                          rt
    therefore, it otherwise could not have sold this product in State of

Himachal Pradesh ( Document No.5 at pages 32 -41 of defendant's

documents). Moreover, this Court finds that website screenshots

produced by the plaintiff ( Annexure M at page No.191 to 194 of

plaintiff's documents) suggest            that that the States selected for

delivery were U.P., and Maharashtra and no order has been shown to

be placed on the website from HP for delivery in Himachal Pradesh.
No such evidence of transaction/delivery in H.P. has been produced

by the plaintiff, therefore, mere listing of infringing product on the

website of defendant No.3 may not be sufficient to invoke jurisdiction

of this Court.
30.           Similarly, this Court is not persuaded to agree with the

submissions made at the behest of the plaintiff that listing of infringing

product on Indiamart would itself confer jurisdiction upon this Court.
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
34
2026:HHC:26056

Though, plaintiff has not shown any sale through Indiamart within the

territorial jurisdiction of this Court, but otherwise by now it is well

.
settled that mere existence of an interactive website accessible within

the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, would not be sufficient for the

suit to be maintainable, rather plaintiff would be additionally required

to show that some commercial transaction was concluded within the

of
    jurisdiction of this Court. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the

judgment rendered by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in case titled Helsinn

Healthcare SA Vs. AET Laboratories Private Limited and Ors.
rt
    passed in CS(Comm.) 1188/2024, wherein it has been held that mere

accessibility of a website including Indiamart, within the territorial

jurisdiction of this Court would not amount to specific targeting of

customers/consumers in territorial jurisdiction of that Court                  in the

absence of any commercial transaction executed through the said

website. Relevant paras of the judgment are reproduced as under:-
"45. In the present case, even after filing additional documents, the
                  plaintiff has failed to show that an order for any of the products of
                  the defendants has been placed on their website or IndiaMart and

that the same has been delivered in Delhi. Mere accessibility of a
                  website within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court would not
                  amount to specific targeting of customers/consumers in Delhi in
                  the absence of any commercial transaction executed through the
                  said website. Thus, the test of 'purposeful availment' of
                  customers/consumers within the jurisdiction of this Court, as laid
                  down in
Banyan Tree
(supra) has not been satisfied in the present
                  case.
46.
In
New Life Laboratories v. Dr. Ilyas New Life Homoeo and
                  Herbals
relied on behalf of the defendants, a coordinate bench of
                  this Court declined to grant an interim injunction in favour of the
                  plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to place any
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
35
2026:HHC:26056

material on record to show that the defendants are selling their
                  products within the jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, on a prima
                  facie view, territorial jurisdiction of this Court was not made out and
                  an interim injunction was denied.
47. The observations made by the coordinate bench in New Life

.
Laboratories
(supra) is squarely applicable in the present case.
The plaintiff has failed to place on record any material to show that
                  any of the products of the defendants are available for sale within
                  the jurisdiction of this Court or they have any customers in Delhi.
48. Therefore, in my prima facie view, the plaintiff has failed to

make out a case for the territorial jurisdiction of this Court."
31.    Though, it came to be argued at the behest of the plaintiff that

of
    evidence in the form of a lone trap order ipso-facto is sufficient to

maintain the suit, but it is trite law that isolated trap purchases cannot
                       rt
    be used to procure jurisdiction, rather sales by defendants at

commercial scale within the territorial jurisdiction must be shown as

has been held in
Indovax Private Limited
case (supra).
32.          At this stage, it is also apt to take note of order dated

06.06.2025 passed by this Court in
SML Limited vs. Mohan &

Company and another
, passed in OMP No.320 of 2023 in COMS

No.6 of 2023, which was heavily relied upon by the plaintiff in the case

at hand. In afore order, this Court dealt with the issue of territorial

jurisdiction in para-55, but bare perusal of the same reveals that there

was no admission by retailer i.e. defendant No.1 that manufacture

defendant No. 2
in that case
had neither authorized the retailer nor

supplied the product to the retailer. Moreover, in afore case defendant

No.2 was shown to have manufacturing unit in Himachal Pradesh.
Most importantly in afore judgment, this Court                 did not deal with
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
36
2026:HHC:26056

provision of   FCO pertaining to grant of authorization to sell to a

retailer based on submissions of Certificate of Source in Form O

.
received from the manufacturer or wholesaler. Aforesaid order was

laid challenge in appeal before the Division Bench of this Court i.e.

COMAP No. 2 of 2025, titled Safex Chemicals Private Limited vs.

SML Limited and another, wherein Division Bench of this Court

of
    though did not go into the findings given by this Court with regard to

alleged infringement of the patent granted in favour of the plaintiff in

that case, but set aside the finding given by this Court that it has
                       rt
    territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
While placing reliance upon

the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in
Asma Lateef
(supra),

Division Bench of this Court arrived at a conclusion that there is no

cause of action/wrong done to invoke the territorial jurisdiction of this

Court insofar as appellant/defendant No.2 is concerned. The alleged

cause of action/wrong done by appellant/defendant No.2 is a triable

issue, as a consequences whereof, the impugned order was vacated.
At this stage, it would be profitable to reproduce paras No. 36 to 43 of

the judgment passed by Division Bench of this Court in                        Safex

Chemicals Private Limtied case(supra) herein below:-
"6. From a perusal of the aforesaid order dated 08.01.2026, it is
                     evident that respondent No.2 (defendant No.1) had no
                     authorization, express or implied to sell the infringing product
                     "Aladdin", as per the authorization on the basis of which the
                     said respondent No. 2 is carrying on his business.
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
37
2026:HHC:26056
37. The possibility of one being dragged into litigation, by
        adducing flimsy material, cannot be ruled out as it is easy for
        the present appellant to be dragged into litigation if the only
        material necessary to give jurisdiction to a court is a few

.
invoices issued by an entity, who is not an authorised
        representative of the appellant, to some third parties. Since the
        only material placed on record is in the form of four transactions

entered into by respondent No.2 (defendant No.1), they would
        have to be shown to be obtained using fair means (prima-
facie).   Rieter     AG      and    another       vs.      Kavassery

of
Narayanaswamy Venkatasubramanian, 2025 SSC Online,
        Del 4379 and Kubota Corporation vs. Godabari Agro
        Machinery Services Private Limited and others, I.A.
          rt
        No.1778/2024,      decided   on    12.08.2025     relied    upon    by
        respondent No.1 (plaintiff) were cases of infringement of a

patent. In Rieter AG the plaintiff's investigator had placed an
        order for the defendant's goods and in Kubota Corporation
        offer for sale had been made by the defendant therein to the
        plaintiff's investigator. Hence in both the aforesaid cases it was

shown to the court by fair, authentic transactions that the
        infringement of their patent was happening within the territorial

jurisdiction of the court either by an actual sale or by an offer for
        sale. Such is not the situation in the case at hand.
38. Reliance placed upon
Great Galleon Venture Limited vs.
        Champa Prema Tandel Sole Proprietor of Dharmesh
        Distiller & Another
, C.S. (CoMM) No.343/2023, decided on

01.05.2024 by respondent No.1 is also of no avail. The said
        case pertains to an infraction of a Trademark and a copyright.
        Attention during the course of arguments had been invited to
        Section 134(2) of the Trademark Act, by respondent No.1, to
        show that under the Trademark Act suit can be filed at a place
        wherein the person instituting the suit actually and voluntarily
        resides or carries on business or purposely works for gain. In
        Great Galleon Venture Limited the plaintiff had a subordinate
        office in Delhi. Besides the infringing product therein was liquor
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
38
2026:HHC:26056

being manufactured by the defendant allegedly being sold
        through peddlers in Delhi. Therein on account of the nature of
        goods involved commercial documentation i.e cash memos, tax
        invoices could not have existed for alleged illicit sale of liquor.
.
Hence, based on both accounts i.e Section 134(2) of the
        Trademark Act and averments made in the plaint qua alleged
        illicit sale of liquor suit filed in Delhi was held to be maintainable.
39. Besides the aforesaid, Rieter AG and Kubota Corporation
        were cases wherein an application under Order 7 Rule 10 of the
        Code, seeking return of plaint on the ground of lack of territorial

of
        jurisdiction, was being considered.
In this respect it would be
        appropriate to refer to the apex court judgement in
Exphar Sa
        v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd.
, (2004) 3 SCC 688. Relevant
          rt
        extract whereof reads as under:
"9. Besides, when an objection to jurisdiction is raised by

way of demurrer and not at the trial, the objection must
                  proceed on the basis that the facts as pleaded by the
                  initiator of the impugned proceedings are true. The
                  submission in order to succeed must show that granted

those facts the court does not have jurisdiction as a
                  matter of law. In rejecting a plaint on the ground of

jurisdiction, the Division Bench should have taken the
                  allegations contained in the plaint to be correct."
40. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to the decision
        of the Delhi high Court, in M/s
Allied Blender & Distillers Pvt.
        Limited vs. Prag Distillers Private Limited and another
,

2017 SCC Online Del 7225 (FAO (OS) No.49/2017, decided on
        01.03.2017),      wherein,    it   has   been     clarified   that    the
        consideration with regard to territorial jurisdiction in the context
        of Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code are entirely different from those
        in an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code.
        The relevant extract, whereof, is being reproduced here-in-
        under:-
"14. It must be clarified that the considerations with
              regard to territorial jurisdiction in the context of Order VII
              Rule 10 of the Code are entirely different from those in an
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
39
2026:HHC:26056

application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the Code or
             when a finding is to be returned on the issue of territorial
             jurisdiction. Under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code, only the
             averments in the plaint are to be seen and that, too, on
             the assumption that they are correct. While considering

.
an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of the

Code, not only the averments in the plaint but also other
             material including the defendant's reply and written
             statement are to be seen. For establishing the existence
             of a prime facie case (a condition precedent for an ad

interim injunction order), the plaintiff would obviously have
             to demonstrate, albeit at a prima facie level, that the
             apprehension was reasonable and credible. Here, a mere
             averment in the plaint would not do. And, the assumption

of
             that the averments in the plaint are correct would also not
             be available. Where the issue of jurisdiction is to be
             decided at the trial, the standard of proof would be even
             higher. Therefore, while for the purposes of an
           rtexamination under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code, the
             court may 'conclude' that it has territorial jurisdiction, this
             would not come in the way of the defendant in raising a
             question as to territorial jurisdiction, both, when the issue

of temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 of
             the Code is being considered and when an issue as to
             territorial jurisdiction is being decided in the trial of the
             suit. In other words, while a plaintiff may succeed in
             demonstrating, for the purposes of Order VII Rule 10 of
             the Code that this court has territorial jurisdiction and that

the plaint ought not to be returned, he may fail in
             obtaining an order of interim injunction on the ground that
             the plaintiff's case is itself shaky because the issue of
             territorial jurisdiction is highly debatable and prima facie

not tenable. Therefore, the decision of the court in
             rejecting the objection of the defendant and in refusing the

defendant's prayer for return of the plaint under Order VII
             Rule 10 of the Code, would not come in the way of the
             defendant raising the question of territorial jurisdiction,
             both as an objection to the grant of an interim injunction

as also at the time of decision of the issue of territorial
             jurisdiction, if framed, at the trial of the suit."
41. Similarly, in OSA No.38, 40 and 42 of 2020 titled Sulphur
        Mills Limited vs. M/s Dayal Fertilizers Private Limited, (DB
        Madras High Court) decided on 11.11.2020, an application
        seeking revocation of leave granted to the appellant (plaintiff)
        therein, was being considered. The same was a case of a
        patent infringement. Therein it was held that a suit could be
        maintained on the basis of a lone "trap order" and further
        whether the defendants/respondents therein were offloading
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
40
2026:HHC:26056

their product within the jurisdiction of the court or not was to be
        decided at trial and not in the application seeking revocation of
        leave.
42.        Last but not the least it has been contended on

.
behalf of the respondent No.1/plaintiff that since in the suit filed
        in the case at hand one of the reliefs sought is for grant of
        damages, therefore, for the purpose of territorial jurisdiction in

the aforestated factual matrix whereby infringement is alleged to
        have taken place within the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble court
section 19
CPC which pertains to suits for compensation for

of
        wrongs to person or movables would be applicable.
Section 19
CPC reads as under;
rt   19. Suits for compensation for wrongs to person or
              movables.-- Where a suit is for compensation for wrong
              done to the person or to movable property, if the wrong
              was done within the local limits of the jurisdiction of one

Court and the defendant resides, or carries on business,
              or personally works for gain, within the local limits of the
              jurisdiction of another Court, the suit may be instituted at
              the option of the plaintiff in either of the said Courts.
              Illustrations
(a) A, residing in Delhi, beats B in Calcutta. B may sue

A either in Calcutta or in Delhi.
(b) A, residing in Delhi, publishes in Calcutta
                  statements defamatory of B. B may sue A either in
                  Calcutta or in Delhi.
From the reasons recorded supra prima-facie it is
                  evident that the alleged wrong in the case at hand has

not been committed by the appellant/defendant No.2.
43. For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed as prima-
        facie this Court is convinced that in the facts and attending
        circumstances of the case at hand, there exists no cause of

action/wrong done to invoke the territorial jurisdiction of this
        Court insofar as appellant/defendant No.2 is concerned. The
        alleged cause of action/wrong done by appellant/defendant
        No.2 is a triable issue. As a consequence whereof, the
        impugned interim order dated 06.06.2025, passed in OMP
        No.320/23 in COMS No.6/2026, insofar as it pertains to
        appellant/defendant No.2, shall stand vacated. Needless to say,
        the present observation herein are only for deciding the issue of
        the injunction at this stage and will not influence the learned
        Single Judge to come to a contrary finding on the basis of
        additional material, if any, brought on record by the parties."
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS
41
2026:HHC:26056
33.               In view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove as

well as law taken into consideration, on the parameter of territorial

.
jurisdiction the plaintiff has failed to make a prima-facie case for grant

of interim injunction, as has been held in
Asma Lateef
(supra)

reproduced hereinabove. Since this Court for the reason and law

taken into consideration hereinabove, is convinced that this Court has

of
    no territorial jurisdiction, there appears to be no occasion to go into

the other aspects of the matter with regard to alleged infringement of

suit patent.
rt
34.               Consequently, in view of the above, this Court finds no

merit in the present application and accordingly same is dismissed.
35.               Any observation made herein above shall not be

construed to be a reflection on the merits of the case and shall remain

confined to the disposal of the present application alone.
COMS No.03 of 2024
Be listed on 23.09.2026 for admission and denial of the

documents before the Registrar (Judicial).
(Sandeep Sharma),
                                                                Judge
    July 02, 2026
          (shankar)
::: Downloaded on - 06/07/2026 20:32:52 :::CIS

Update Case Entry